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Worldwide, millions of people gamble on Internet
gambling sites, generating billions of dollars of online revenue.
Many of these online gambling operations presently accept bets
from United States citizens in violation of U.S. federal laws.
Most of these Internet gambling operations are based in foreign
jurisdictions where Internet gambling is legal.  Consequently, it
is rare for the U.S. Government to prosecute these crimes.  In
addition, other changes to the gambling landscape in the U.S.
and the world, such as the rise in state-sponsored lotteries, the
growth of gambling operations on Native American reserva-
tions, and the increase in mainstream foreign
investment in online gambling, beg the question:
should the Federal Government continue to bluff
on the issue of outlawed Internet gambling, or is
it time to fold and encourage the creation of state
and federal mechanisms for constructively regu-
lating this industry?
This paper first describes the various
aspects of Internet gambling, and then reviews
the U.S. criminal laws that apply to gambling
conducted online.  As part of this review, sever-
al criminal and civil cases involving Internet
gambling activities are discussed.  Finally, how
the rapidly changing gambling landscape in the
United States and the world may affect future federal lawmak-
ing efforts for controlling Internet gambling is considered.
In 1999, there were 700 Internet gambling sites.1
However, by 2004 more than 1,800 offshore gambling Internet
sites received about seven billion dollars in bets, with the online
gambling industry projected to be an 18.4 billion dollar per year
industry by 2010.2 Internet gambling sites offer a variety of
gambling venues, such as casino-style gambling, off-shore
sports booking operations for betting on sporting events and
horse races, etc., and, recently, increasingly popular interactive
Internet party poker games.  A brief explanation of how these
various Internet gambling sites operate follows.
An Internet gambling casino is designed to mimic a
real casino, and the gambler is typically invited to download
gambling software, open an account, wire money to the account
to purchase virtual “chips,” before the gambler may proceed to
play various online games of chance such as slots, blackjack or
roulette.3 The outcomes of play are determined by a random
number generator.4 The winnings are credited to, and the losses
are debited from, the user’s account.
Another Internet gambling business model is patterned
off of bookmaking on sporting events, where the gambler opens
an account and then can place bets on various sporting events.5
Internet bookmaking activities may charge a commission, called
a ”vig,” on each bet.  The vig can be as high as 10% of the total 
bet.  Similar to the online casino, the winnings are credited to,
and losses and fees are debited against, the gambler’s account. 
A recent addition to Internet gambling is the formation
of online poker sites where players log-on to play against other
players.6 Under this business model, the website operator does
not directly participate in the gambling; instead, the web opera-
tor manages the poker pot while the players gamble between
themselves.  The website’s random number generator deter-
mines what cards the players get and the web operator takes a
cut, called a “rake,” of each pot, which is the total amount of
money bet in a single game.  Typically, the rake is 2 to 5 % of
the pot.  Under this model, the operator of the online poker site
does not gamble against the poker players.  Only
the poker players are gambling, and they gamble
against one another.
There are many federal laws applicable to
Internet gambling activities, including (1) 18
U.S.C. § 1084, known as the “Wire Act,” which
criminalizes the use of interstate telephone facil-
ities by those in a gambling enterprise to trans-
mit gambling-related information, (2)  18 U.S.C.
§ 1952, known as the “Travel Act,” which crim-
inalizes the use of any interstate facility with
intent to promote an unlawful activity such as illegal gambling,
(3) 18 U.S.C. § 1955, known as the “Illegal Gambling Business
Act,” which prohibits illegal gambling businesses involving five
or more persons, (4) 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957, which crimi-
nalize money laundering, and (5) 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 and 1962,
which outlaw racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations.7
While other federal gambling statutes may conceivably apply to
Internet gambling activities, the present article is limited to dis-
cussing the seven statutes listed above.8
The Wire Act
The Wire Act9 pertains to (1) persons engaged in the
business of betting or wagering, who (2) knowingly use a wire
communication facility (i) for the transmission of bets or
wagers, or information assisting the placement of bets or
wagers, in interstate commerce or foreign commerce on any
sporting event or contest, or (ii) for the transmission of a wire
communication which entitles the recipient to receive money or
credit as a result of bets or wagers, or (iii) for information assist-
ing in the placing of bets or wages.10 However, the Wire Act
includes a “safe harbor” provision which exempts from criminal
liability the transmission, in interstate or foreign commerce, of
information for use in news reporting of sporting events or con-
tests, or for the transmission of information assisting in the plac-
ing of bets or wagers on a sporting event or contest from which
a state or foreign country, where betting on that sporting event
or contest is legal, into a state or foreign country in which such 
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betting is legal.11
In other words, the Wire Act prohibits persons
engaged in the business of betting or wagering from using
interstate telephone facilities to transmit gambling related
information.  More specifically, the Wire Act prohibits the
transmission of any gambling related information and it pro-
hibits the transmission of sports bets.  Because the Wire Act is
addressed to persons “engaged in the business of betting or
wagering,” it applies to those persons operating a betting or
wagering business, but not to the customers (i.e., the bettors)
who use the services of the business.  In order to apply the Wire
Act to Internet gambling, the government needs to prove: (1)
the website is engaged in the business of betting, (2) the web-
site owner knows that the bets are being transmitted through a
wire communication facility, (3) the bets are being transmitted
in interstate or foreign commerce, and (4) the Internet gam-
bling business or the players are able to receive money or cred-
it as a result of the bets.12 However, the scope of the Wire Act
may be limited to gambling on sporting events or contests, and
may not apply to other forms of Internet gambling such as the
virtual casinos or online poker sites.13
While the Wire Act has not been invoked extensively
in combating illegal gambling, it has been applied to at least
one published appellate case of Internet gambling: U.S. v.
Cohen.14 In Cohen, defendant Jay Cohen had moved to
Antigua in 1996 and established himself as President of World
Sports Exchange (“WSE”), a bookmaking business patterned
after New York’s Off-Track Betting.15 WSE’s business
involved bookmaking on American sports events and was not
limited to gambling on horse races.16
WSE operated an “account-wagering system,” where-
in new customers would open an account with WSE and wire
at least $300 into WSE’s Antiguan bank account.17 A gambler
seeking to place a bet would then contact WSE via either tele-
phone or the Internet to bet.18 WSE would then issue an imme-
diate, automatic acceptance and confirmation of the bet and
would subtract losing bets from the gambler’s account and
credit winnings to this account.19 WSE also made money by
retaining a “vig” or commission of 10% of each bet.20 WSE
advertised its bookmaking operation in the United States by
radio, newspaper and television.21 WSE’s customers were pri-
marily gamblers located in the United States.22 WSE was suc-
cessful, and in one fifteen-month period WSE collected about
$5.3 million dollars in funds from U.S. gamblers.  
The FBI investigated WSE’s bookmaking operation.
FBI agents called WSE from New York, where sports-betting
is illegal, and opened accounts and placed sports bets with
WSE in Antigua, where it is legal.23 In 1998, Cohen was
arrested and, after a 10-day jury trial, was convicted of five
counts of violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a).24 Cohen appealed
the Wire Act convictions alleging that (1) the safe harbor pro-
vision of 18 U.S.C. § 1084(b) should have been applied, and
(2) the government had not shown that Cohen had “knowing-
ly” violated the statute.25 Cohen’s appeal also requested the
2nd Circuit invoke the rule of lenity and reverse the conviction
on the grounds the statute was too unclear to provide adequate
warning of what conduct is prohibited.26
The 2nd Circuit ruled that the safe harbor provision of
18 U.S.C. § 1084(b) pertains to transmissions wherein (1) bet-
ting is legal in both the place of origin and the destination of
the transmission, and (2) the transmission is limited to mere
information that assists in the placing of bets as opposed to
including the bets themselves.27 Cohen argued that betting was
legal in both Antigua and in New York, and that the transmis-
sions by the customers merely assisted in the placing of bets,
which was affected in Antigua by WSE.  The 2nd Circuit
rejected both of these arguments.
First, the 2nd Circuit opined that there was no doubt
betting was illegal in New York, which expressly prohibits bet-
ting in its Constitution28 and in its General Obligations Law.29
Therefore, the 2nd Circuit concluded the safe harbor provision,
18 U.S.C. § 1084(b), did not apply to Cohen’s case as a matter
of law.30 Next, the 2nd Circuit rejected Cohen’s argument that
WSE’s account wagering system used transmissions between
gamblers and WSE containing only information enabling WSE
to place bets in Antigua on behalf of its customers.31 The 2nd
Circuit noted that WSE could only place bets its customers had
requested and authorized to be booked.  Therefore, the 2nd
Circuit concluded that, by making betting requests and having
these requests accepted, WSE’s customers were placing bets,
which is conduct falling squarely in violation of § 1084(a) and
outside the scope of the safe harbor provision of § 1084(b).32
The 2nd Circuit also rejected Cohen’s argument that
he lacked the requisite mens rea to sustain a conviction.33 The
2nd Circuit ruled that it was only necessary for the government
to establish Cohen knowingly committed the deeds violating §
1084(a), not that Cohen intended to violate the statute.34
Therefore, the court concluded that Cohen’s admission that he
knowingly transmitted information assisting in the placement
of bets was sufficient to satisfy the mens rea requirement of the
statute.35
Regarding whether lenity should be granted by the
court, Cohen argued the statute did not provide fair warning of
(1) whether the phrase “bet or wager” included WSE’s
“account wagering,” (2) whether “transmission” included
receiving information as well as sending information, and (3)
whether betting must be legal or merely non-criminal in a par-
ticular jurisdiction in order to be considered “legal” in that
jurisdiction.36 The 2nd Circuit rejected all of Cohen’s argu-
ments for lenity.
Specifically, the 2nd Circuit explained the rule of leni-
ty applies where there exists a “grievous ambiguity” in a statute
such that a court would have to “guess” as to what Congress
intended.37 In this case, the 2nd Circuit ruled that § 1084(a)
was clear so lenity would not be applied.38 With respect to
“bets or wagers,” the 2nd Circuit held it was clear that WSE’s
account-wagering was in fact “wagering” because a gambler
would request a bet by telephone or via the Internet and WSE
would accept the bet.39 The 2nd Circuit explained that WSE’s
requirement for gamblers to maintain a fully-funded account as
a condition to place bets did not obscure the issue.40
Regarding the term “transmission,” the 2nd Circuit
noted that Cohen had used two wire facilities, the telephone
and the Internet, and had marketed these facilities to the public
for the express purpose of transmitting bets and betting infor-
mation.41 The court noted that Cohen had received transmis-
sions from customers placing bets, and in response, sent
acceptance and confirmation transmissions back to these
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customers.  On these facts, the 2nd Circuit concluded that it
was clear that a “transmission” in accordance with § 1084(a)
had occurred whether the signal was the betting information
provided by the gambler or the confirmation signal provided by
WSE.42
Lastly, with respect to Cohen’s third argument, the 2nd
Circuit ruled it was plain to all that an act must be permitted by
law to be legal.43 The 2nd Circuit reiterated that the safe har-
bor provision of § 1084(b) was clear and did not apply to the
facts of Cohen’s case.44
The Travel Act
Under the Travel Act45, it is unlawful for a person to
(1) use any facility in interstate commerce, (2) with the intent to
promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promo-
tion, management, establishment, or carrying on, of any unlaw-
ful activity (i.e., a business enterprise involving illegal gam-
bling), and (3) thereafter perform or attempt to perform any of
the following acts: (i) distribution of the proceeds of the unlaw-
ful activity, (ii) commit any crime of violence to further the
unlawful activity, or (iii) otherwise act to promote, manage,
establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management,
establishment or carrying on of the unlawful activity.46 Under
18 U.S.C. § 1952(b) of the Travel Act, any business enterprise
involving gambling in violation of the laws of the state in which
the acts are committed, or in violation of the laws of the United
States, is an “unlawful activity.”47
Stated otherwise, it is a federal crime to use a facility
of interstate commerce to promote, manage, establish, carry on
or facilitate any unlawful business enterprise involving gam-
bling, where the gambling enterprise violates either state or fed-
eral law.  It is important to realize that the Travel Act criminal-
izes the use of both interstate and foreign facilities in further-
ance of unlawful gambling, and not the violation of state law.48
Consequently, it is not necessary for the government to prove
that a state crime was ever completed.49 Furthermore, the
Travel Act does not define the term “gambling” per se, so it is
likely that Travel Act violations encompass any form of Internet
gambling prohibited either by the state or federal law so long as
a facility of interstate or foreign commerce is employed.50
At least one state court has concluded that gambling
via the Internet from New York to an offshore site in Antigua
violates New York Penal Law and the Travel Act.  In People v.
World Interactive Gaming Corp., the Attorney General of the
State of New York sought to enjoin World Interactive Gaming
Corporation (“WIGC”) from operating within New York or
offering to residents of New York the ability to gamble over the
internet.51 At issue was whether the State of New York could
enjoin a foreign corporation, which was legally licensed to
operate a casino offshore, from offering Internet gambling to
individuals located in New York.52
The state court ruled that New York State could enjoin
WIGC from offering Internet gambling services to persons
located in New York because (1) Article 1 of the New York
State Constitution expressly prohibited any kind of gambling
not authorized by the state legislature, and (2) Internet gambling
would violate New York Penal Law and § 1952(a) of the Travel
Act.53
WIGC was a Delaware corporation that maintained
corporate offices in New York and wholly owned Golden Chips
Casino, Inc. (“GCC”), an Antiguan subsidiary corporation
licensed to operate a land-based casino in Antigua.54 GCC
developed the interactive software and assembled and installed
the necessary servers in Antigua that allowed individuals from
around the world to gamble from their home computers using
GCC’s web-based casino.55 GCC promoted its online casino by
advertising on the GCC’s website, by advertising elsewhere on
the Internet, and by publishing advertisements in a U.S. nation-
al gambling magazine.56 GCC’s promotions were viewed by
residents in New York and across the nation.57
In 1998, the Attorney General of New York began
investigating WIGC when the company began soliciting
investors in Texas and elsewhere for a private securities offer-
ing in violation of certain New York laws.58 The Attorney
General discovered WIGC had informed potential investors that
profit margins of web-based casinos were conservatively 80-
85%.59 As part of its investigation, the Attorney General’s
office logged onto the GCC website, downloaded gambling
software and began placing bets.60
In opening an account with GCC, a user had to enter
his permanent address.61 Users submitting an address in a state
that permitted land-based gambling, such as Nevada, were able
to access the GCC casino, whereas users submitting an address
in a state that did not permit land-based gambling, such as New
York, were denied access to the GCC casino.62 The Attorney
General soon learned that the GCC software did not verify a
user’s address, so an individual located in New York would be
granted access to the GCC casino by simply changing the state
of residence entered into the GCC database from New York to
Nevada.63 Once granted access to GCC’s Internet casino, an
individual located in New York could play virtual slots, black-
jack or roulette.64
Subsequently, the Attorney General filed suit seeking
to enjoin WIGC and its subsidiary GCC from running any
aspect of their Internet gambling business within New York
State.65 WIGC moved to dismiss the suit on the grounds of lack
of subject matter jurisdiction of New York to prosecute alleged
violations of the Wire Act66, the Travel Act67, and the
Paraphernalia Act.68
In short, WIGC argued that New York lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over the Internet gambling activity because
the gambling occurred outside of New York State.69 The court
rejected this argument on the grounds that, under New York
Penal Law § 225.00(2), when a person engaged in gambling is
located in New York, then New York is construed as the loca-
tion where the gambling occurred.70 The court considered the
facts that the monies used to gamble were located in Antiguan
accounts and that gambling is legal in Antigua irrelevant
because the act of entering a bet and transmitting it from New
York via the Internet adequately constituted gambling activity
within New York.71
The New York court also opined that the Wire Act, the
Travel Act, and the Paraphernalia Act all applied to WIGC’s
Internet gambling activites.72 The court explained that the Wire
Act applied to businesses involved in betting or wagering, and
the Travel Act applied to the use of a facility in interstate or for-
eign commerce with intent to distribute proceeds of any unlaw-
ful activity or to otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry
6Fall 2006
on, or facilitate any unlawful activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1952.73
In particular, the New York court noted that the Internet is
accessed by telephone wire in the same manner as a prohibited
telephone call from an illegal gambling facility.74 The court rea-
soned that when a person in New York uses a telephone wire to
connect to the GCC server for the purpose of logging onto the
illegal gambling website, followed by gambling activity using the
website and the transmission by the GCC server of betting infor-
mation back to the user in New York, there has been a violation
of both the Wire Act and the Travel Act.75 The New York court
also concluded that by hosting a virtual casino, which is created
for a time in the gambler’s computer in New York, and by
exchanging betting information with this computer user, GCC
had conducted an illegal gambling communication in violation of
the Wire Act and the Travel Act.76 Inherent to the court’s conclu-
sion is the notion that access to the Internet necessarily involves
use of a wire communication facility (i.e., telephone wires),
which is an element of a Wire Act violation, and that the Internet
is a facility used in interstate or foreign com-
merce, which is an element of a Travel Act vio-
lation.              
The Illegal Gambling Business Act
The Illegal Gambling Business Act77
pertains to (1) those who conduct, finance, man-
age, supervise, direct, or own all or part of an
illegal gambling business, wherein (2) an “ille-
gal gambling business” means a gambling busi-
ness (i) in violation of the law of the state or
political subdivision in which it is conducted,
and (ii) involving five or more persons who con-
duct, manage, supervise, direct, or own all or
part of the business, and (iii) that has been or remains in substan-
tially continuous operation for a period in excess of thirty days or
has a gross revenue of $2,000.00 in any single day.78 Gambling
is defined under the statute as including, but not limited to, pool-
selling, bookmaking, maintaining slot machines, roulette wheels
or dice tables, and conducting lotteries, policy, bolita or numbers
games, or selling chances therein.79
Congress passed the Illegal Gambling Business Act as
part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 in an effort to
combat large scale illegal activities.80 The Illegal Gambling
Business Act does not apply to individual players, and is unlike-
ly to apply to Internet service providers, because they are not
gambling businesses in accordance with the statute.  The statute
does not require those operating an illegal gambling business to
actually be convicted in a state court, but only that (1) there be
some state law violated by the business, (2) the gambling busi-
ness involved five or more persons, and (3) the business remained
in substantially continuous operation for more than thirty days or
grossed more than $2,000.00 in any single day.81 Furthermore,
to be construed as a person involved in the business, it is only
necessary for the individual to be considered necessary and help-
ful.82 Thus, computer operators, computer maintenance crews,
accountants, telephone operators, on-line help desk operators, and
owners may be included as persons involved in the business even
though not all of these individuals participate in the actual gam-
bling.83 One interesting feature regarding the Illegal Gambling
Business Act is that it may be applied to strictly intrastate illegal
gambling businesses.84
Based on what is known about online gambling web-
sites, it is likely that these activities involve a violation of state
gambling laws85, involve five or more people, and have been in
substantially continuous operation for 30 days or more or have
grossed over $2,000.00 in revenue in any single day.  Specifically,
§ 1955(b) of the Illegal Gambling Business Act explicitly defines
bookmaking activities as “gambling,” so online sports betting
sites clearly fall within the scope of this Act.  Though online casi-
nos rely upon random number generators to play virtual slots,
roulette, dice and other traditional casino games, it is uncertain
whether they would fall within the scope of the Illegal Gambling
Business Act.  Section 1955(b) explicitly defines gambling to
include activities involving “maintaining slot machines, roulette
wheels or dice tables.”86 It would be reasonable for the courts to
construe any corresponding virtual casino games, which deter-
mine chance outcomes using electronic random number genera-
tors, as falling within the open ended definition of “gambling”
provided by the statute. 
Less clear is whether online poker sites are
involved in “gambling” as defined under the
Illegal Gambling Business Act, because it is the
players who gamble and not the site operators.
Since online poker sites depend upon random
number generators to determine which cards are
dealt to the players, and since the poker site
receives a fee for this service in the form of the
rake, the Illegal Gambling Business Act could
reasonably apply to online poker sites if the
activity is construable as “selling chances” in
accordance with § 1955(b)(2) of the Act.
Despite the fact that Internet gambling opera-
tions have likely violated the Illegal Gambling
Business Act, there is no published case of a
prosecution of an Internet gambling business under this statute.
Money Laundering Statutes
To deal with money laundering, Congress has enacted
various statutes including 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957, both of
which address the financial disposition of proceeds of various
state and federal crimes, including violations of the Wire Act, the
Travel Act, the Illegal Gambling Business Act, or any state gam-
bling law punishable by over one year imprisonment.87 Section
1956 encompasses several distinct crimes including: (1) launder-
ing with intent to promote an illicit activity such as an illegal
gambling business; (2) laundering to evade taxes; (3) laundering
to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or
control of funds derived from illegal activities; (4) conducting
transactions in a way so as to avoid state or federal reporting
requirements (i.e., smurfing); (5) international laundering; and (6)
“laundering” conduct represented to a government agent author-
ized to investigate or prosecute § 1956 violations (i.e., laundering
conduct by those caught in a government sting operation).88
Section 1957 criminalizes the spending of money or
assets that are criminally derived, and the elements of such an
offense include: (1) knowingly (2) engaging or attempting to
engage in (3) a monetary transaction (4) in criminally derived
property that is of a value greater than $10,000.00 and is derived
from specified unlawful activity, (5) wherein the § 1957 offense
takes place in the United States or in a special maritime and terri-
torial jurisdiction of the United States or the offense takes place  
Less clear is whether online
poker sites are involved in
“gambling” as defined under
the Illegal Gambling Business
Act, because it is the players
who gamble and not the site
operators.
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outside of the United States and its jurisdictions but the defendant
is a United States citizen.89
There has yet to be a reported prosecution of an Internet
gambling operation for violations of U.S. federal money launder-
ing statutes.  However, it is likely Internet gambling sites are
involved in one or more of the placement, layering and integra-
tion stages of money laundering.90 Placement is the act of
depositing illegally derived funds into a financial institution or
the act of converting the funds into other monetary instruments.
Layering is the act of breaking up and transferring the deposit-
ed funds to different accounts and institutions in order to con-
ceal the origin of these deposited funds.  Lastly, integration is
the act of using the layered funds to purchase legitimate assets
or to fund further criminal activities.
Typically, Internet gambling sites require prepayment
in electronic dollars (i.e., payment via online credit services or
via wire).91 In addition to providing credit accounts, many
Internet gambling services also offer other financial services
such as fund transmittal services, check cashing services, and
currency exchange services.92 Therefore, online gambling sites
may collect lawful fees for these ancillary services.
Furthermore, Internet gambling is a global industry and many
of the customers of these gambling sites are citizens of foreign
countries gambling from jurisdictions that do not prohibit
Internet gambling.93 Consequently, funds derived from illegal
gambling with U.S. citizens are likely intermingled with lawful
funds.  When Internet gambling sites process these mixed funds
with various financial institutions, it is conceivable that one or
more of the U.S. money laundering statutes are violated.  
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Statutes 
To combat organized racketeering enterprises,
Congress has enacted a series of laws directed to Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”).94 Because the
Wire Act, the Travel Act, the Illegal Gambling Business Act,
and any violation of a state law punishable by more than one
year imprisonment are all RICO predicate offenses, illegal gam-
bling may violate the RICO statutes.95 To establish a RICO
offense pursuant to § 1962(c), the government must establish
(1) an enterprise existed; (2) the enterprise affected interstate or
foreign commerce; (3) the defendant was employed by or asso-
ciated with the enterprise; (4) the defendant conducted or par-
ticipated, either directly or indirectly, in conducting the affairs
of the enterprise; and (5) that the defendant conducted or partic-
ipated in the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering by
committing at least two racketeering predicate offenses within
a ten year period.96 The RICO Act includes a civil remedies
provision, so a private individual may sue for damages incurred
as a result of racketeering activities.97
While there has been no published federal prosecution
of an Internet gambling site provider under the RICO Act, there
has been a civil suit to collect damages for alleged RICO viola-
tions.98 Internet gambling litigation ensued in In re MasterCard
International Inc. when two luckless gamblers from Kansas and
New Hampshire filed suit against the credit card companies and
the issuing banks for extending them credit, which allowed the
gamblers to gamble at online casinos.  On the following facts,
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the gamblers’ com-
plaint against the credit card companies.99
The plaintiffs individually accessed various casino
websites where they were instructed to purchase “credit” for
gambling.100 The plaintiffs then entered their billing and cred-
it card information on these websites, and their credit cards
were charged for the purchase of the credits.101 Thereafter,
plaintiffs were allowed to place wagers.102 Net winnings would
be wired to the plaintiffs and not credited to the credit card
account.103 One plaintiff purchased $1,510 in gambling credits
and lost it all.104 The other plaintiff purchased $16,445 in gam-
bling credit and lost a significant portion of it.105
The plaintiffs argued that the availability of credit and
the ability to gamble are inseparable.106 By authorizing online
casinos to accept credit cards, by making credit available to
gamblers, by encouraging the use of credit card transactions
through placement of their logos on the Internet gambling sites,
and by processing “gambling debts,” the plaintiffs alleged that
the credit card companies were facilitating an unlawful gam-
bling enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).107 In other
words, the defendant credit card companies, along with
unnamed Internet casinos, had created and were operating a
worldwide gambling enterprise in violation of the RICO
statutes.108 The litigation sought recovery of damages under
the civil remedy provision of the RICO Act.109
The appellate court noted that in order to prevail,
plaintiffs must show that (1) a person has engaged in (2) a pat-
tern of racketeering activity, (3) connected to the acquisition,
establishment, conduct or control of an unlawful enterprise.110
Furthermore, a showing of “a pattern of racketeering activity”
requires establishing two or more predicate offenses and
demonstrating the racketeering predicate offenses are related to
a continued criminal activity.111 In support of their claim, plain-
tiffs alleged violations of Kansas and New Hampshire state
felony gambling laws,112 and federal violations of the Wire Act,
the Travel Act, money laundering statutes and mail fraud and
wire fraud statutes.  The appellate court concluded, for the rea-
sons set forth below, that these allegations were unsubstantiat-
ed and therefore that plaintiffs had failed to show a pattern of
racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt.113
As to whether Kansas and New Hampshire state
felony gambling laws were violated, the court first determined
that only sections (c) and (e) of the Kansas commercial gam-
bling statute were applicable to the present case.  However, the
court interpreted, under these sections, that the offending con-
duct can only take place after some form of gambling has been
completed.  The court ruled that, because the credit card trans-
actions were completed before gambling activities occurred,
there was no violation of the Kansas law.114 Regarding the alle-
gation of crimes under the New Hampshire gambling statute,
the court held this statute was patently inapplicable to the facts
of the case.115 Implicitly, the court’s decision reflected the fact
that there was no evidence showing that the credit card compa-
nies were involved in conducting, financing, managing, super-
vising, directing, or owning Internet casinos.
The court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ allegations of
federal predicate offenses.116 Regarding the Wire Act, the court
ruled that this law was limited to sports bookmaking operations
and did not necessarily apply to online casinos.117 Since the
plaintiffs’ evidence did not establish gambling on sporting
events or contests, the court concluded that no violation of the
Wire Act had been established.118 This court’s decision, there-
fore, raised doubt about the scope of the Wire Act, which at
least one state court and the U.S. Department of Justice
believed was not limited to sports-related gambling.119 While
the Justice Department has recommended that Congress amend
the Wire Act to explicitly encompass all forms of gambling,
Congress has yet to pass any such legislation.120 Regarding the
plaintiffs’ reliance on federal mail or wire fraud violations as
predicate RICO offenses, the court concluded that the plaintiffs
could not show that the credit card companies had made any false
or fraudulent misrepresentations, or reliance by the plaintiffs on
such misrepresentations.121 The court decided that because
online casino gambling did not violate the Wire Act, the plain-
tiffs’ gambling debts were legal.122 Consequently, the credit card
companies could not fraudulently misrepresent the nature of the
gambling debt nor could the issuing banks be involved in a
scheme to defraud the plaintiffs.123 In addition, the court noted
that the plaintiffs had failed to show that they relied on the defen-
dants’ representations in deciding to gamble, which, though not
a statutory requirement of mail or wire fraud, courts have
required when these offenses are alleged as RICO predicates.124
Moreover, the court held that plaintiffs’ failure to establish a vio-
lation of any state or federal law, as required under 18 U.S.C. §§
1952 and 1957, compelled the conclusion that no Travel Act or
money laundering violations had been shown.125 The court con-
cluded that because the plaintiffs had failed to prove that the
defendant credit card companies had engaged in a pattern of
racketeering, the case had been rightly dismissed under Rule
12(b)(6).126
Even though the plaintiffs lost their suit, the In re
MasterCard litigation may have had an effect on whether some
American credit card companies do business with Internet gam-
bling sites.  For example, PayPal, Western Union and American
Express do not do business with Internet gambling sites,127
although MasterCard and Visa do.128 It is conceivable that some
credit card companies have shied away from doing business with
online gambling business out of fear of criminal and/or civil liti-
gation.  As a result, new offshore money transfer companies have
arisen to service this niche, such as NETeller, a publicly traded
company on the London Stock Exchange based in the Isle of
Man.129 NETeller derives 80% of its revenue from Internet gam-
bling, with projected net earnings of $32 million for 2004 and
$70 million for 2005.  
The scope of any law depends upon the nation’s ability
to enforce it.  While there are many federal statutes criminalizing
various Internet gambling behavior, prosecutions of illegal
Internet gambling activities are rare, although in July 2006 the
U.S. Justice Department charged eleven people for operating off-
shore Internet gambling sites, including BetOnSports, a gam-
bling enterprise that handles billions of dollars in bets per year
and that is incorporated in the United Kingdom and listed on the
London Stock Exchange.130 One obstacle to enforcing U.S. fed-
eral gambling statutes against online gambling activities, such as
BetOnSports, is that the managing organizations are generally
based in foreign jurisdictions where Internet gambling is permit-
ted.  Since Internet gambling has proven so profitable, there is lit-
tle incentive for foreign countries to curb access by U.S. citizens
to online gambling sites, which lawfully generate revenue and
jobs in these countries.  Thus, change in the global gambling
environment has created a disincentive for continued federal
criminalization of Internet gambling businesses for many of the
following reasons. 
Expansion of Global and U.S. Gambling
Since Congress enacted various federal anti-gambling
statutes, the gambling landscape in the United States and
throughout the world has changed dramatically with the advent
of Internet gambling, the increase of state-sponsored gambling
and the rise of Indian gaming.  Around 1995, the first offshore
Internet casinos appeared.131 By 1999 there were 700 Internet
gambling sites, and in 2004, more than 1,800 offshore gambling
sites received about $7 billion in bets.  About fifty-four foreign
governments sanction some form of Internet gambling.132
Interestingly, many of the governments sanctioning Internet
gambling are English-speaking countries and former members of
the British Commonwealth.133
Recently, online gambling was approved by the Nevada
Gaming Control Board and became publicly available to Nevada
residents located in that state.134 While no other state has
approved online gambling, gambling in some form is legal in
nearly every state.  As of 1999, thirty-seven states and the
District of Columbia operated lotteries, and as of 1997 eleven
states permitted commercial casino gambling, and about half of
the states hosted Class III Indian gaming.135 The fact that legal
land-based gambling is so widespread in the United States tends
to erode the rationale for continued criminalization of web-based
gambling.
Rise of Indian Gaming
Oddly, or not so oddly, enough, an unusual American
player striving to legitimize online gaming are the Indian
nations.136 At about the same time Congress was enacting laws
to federally criminalize gambling enterprises violating state laws,
American Indian tribes began experimenting in the late 1960s
and early 1970s with gaming in an attempt to reverse the pover-
ty resulting from decades of genocide and pillage.137 In 1987, a
U.S. Supreme Court decision paved the way for further expan-
sion of Indian gaming when the Court ruled that state laws regu-
lating bingo and card games did not apply to tribal lands gov-
erned by tribal law.138 In 1988, Congress enacted the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”)139 to reaffirm tribal authority
to use Indian gaming to promote tribal economic development,
tribal self-sufficiency and strong tribal government.  The result of
this positive governmental stance on Indian gaming is that 223
tribes are presently operating Indian gaming facilities in 28
states, generating tribal government revenue through gambling.  
Then came tribal online gaming.  In 2000, the Lac
Vieux Desert Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of
Michigan, a federally recognized Indian tribe, operated the Lac
Vieux Desert Resort & Casino, a Class II Bingo facility located
in Michigan.140 At that time, this tribe began developing “Proxy
Play Bingo,” which was a form of Internet gambling.141 During
Proxy Play Bingo, the actual game was conducted live on tribal
land but a principal could watch the progress of the game from
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a remote location via the Internet while a proxy-agent on the
reservation played for the principal.142 The game was played as
a typical bingo game until either a proxy-agent or an on-reserva-
tion bingo card holder declared bingo.143 The result of the game
was then posted on the Internet.144
When the Tribe’s planned proxy bingo gaming was
reviewed by the General Counsel for the National Indian
Gaming Commission, which was the agency responsible for
overseeing Class II Indian Gaming under the IGRA, the agency
disapproved because proxy bingo would involve players that
were located off the Indian reservation.145 The agency conclud-
ed such remote gaming via Internet would fall outside of the
IGRA’s safe harbor and expose the game operators to possible
criminal prosecution under state and federal laws.146 Hearings
on Internet Proxy Bingo were subsequently held before the
Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection Sub-
Committee of the House Commerce Committee.147 Following
the hearings, the Department of Justice sent a letter to the Lac
Vieux Tribe warning them that proxy bingo, if
conducted in part off of Indian lands, could vio-
late state and federal laws.148
The Lac Vieux Tribe filed suit against
the United States Federal Government for
declaratory and injunctive relief.149 However,
the federal court dismissed the action for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.150 The district court
explained that the Tribe was seeking judicial
review of a non-reviewable agency decision, a
judicial order pre-empting future enforcement
action, and a statement that the IGRA authorized
Proxy Play Bingo, and remedies unobtainable
from the court.151 While the Lac Vieux Tribe was not success-
ful in obtaining an exception under the IGRA authorizing
Internet gaming originating from the Indian reservation, the suit
serves to demonstrate an interest on the part of at least one Tribe
in the legalization of Internet bingo and online gaming as a
whole.
U.S. Obligations Under GATS
Additional pressure to legalize Internet gambling has
been exerted by a foreign interest desiring to legalize online
gambling activities in the United States through enforcement of
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”), an inter-
national trade treaty.152 In this trade dispute, Antigua, a former
British colony and member of the Commonwealth, filed a com-
plaint in 2003 with the World Trade Organization (“WTO”)
against the United States alleging that, through state and federal
laws, the United States had imposed a “total prohibition” against
the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services from
Antigua.153 Antigua contended that such a “total prohibition”
against Antigua’s Internet gambling industry was contrary to the
obligations of the United States under GATS.154
The reason for Antigua’s concern was that it derived
millions of dollars of government revenue from licensing fees to
about 119 licensed Internet gambling and betting operations.
Therefore, it was in Antigua’s interest to expand Internet gam-
bling to markets in the U.S.  Antigua argued that the GATS
agreement included specific commitments on gambling and bet-
ting services, and that state and federal laws of the United States
prohibiting Internet gambling were contrary to its obligation to
grant full market access to Antiguan gambling interests.155
A panel was established to consider Antigua’s com-
plaint.  In 2004, the panel concluded Antigua had established a
prima facie case that certain U.S. federal laws, such as the Wire
Act, the Travel Act, and the Illegal Gambling Business Act, as
well as numerous state laws, created an impermissible ban
against the supply of cross-border Internet gambling services,
which was contrary to the obligations of the United States under
certain provisions of the GATS.156 The panel also concluded, in
view of the Interstate Horse Racing Act157,  that the United
States had failed to show that it did not permit pari-mutuel
wagering on horse races via telephone and the Internet.158
The United States appealed the decision of the Panel,
and the matter was considered by the Appellate Body of the
WTO.  After considering additional arguments filed by Antigua
and the United States, the Appellate Body came to six conclu-
sions: (1) the United States had obligated itself under GATS to
specific commitments on gambling and betting
services; (2) by maintaining the Wire Act, the
Travel Act and the Illegal Gambling Business
Act, the United States was acting inconsistently
with its GATS obligations; (3) the concerns
addressed by the Wire Act, the Travel Act and
the Illegal Gambling Business Act fall within the
scope of public morals and/or public order and
are measures necessary to protect public morals
or to maintain public order; (4) the United States
had demonstrated that the Wire Act, the Travel
Act, and the Illegal Gambling Business Act were
necessary to protect public morals and/or main-
tain public order, thereby justifying acts other-
wise inconsistent with GATS; (5) in light of the Interstate
Horseracing Act authorizing off-track wagering on horse races,
the United States did not demonstrate consistent application of
the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the Illegal Gambling Business
Act in accordance with its public morals/public order exception
to the GATS obligations; and (6) while the United States had
demonstrated that the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the Illegal
Gambling Act are measures necessary to protect public morals
or to maintain public order, the United States did not demon-
strate, in view of the Interstate Horseracing Act, that the prohi-
bitions embodied in the above measures were applied to both
foreign and domestic suppliers of remote betting for horse rac-
ing.159 Therefore, the Appellate Body concluded the United
States had not demonstrated that the Wire Act, the Travel Act,
and the Illegal Gambling Business Act were measures either
protecting public morals or maintaining public order.160 
In other words, the Appellate Body decided the United
States had an obligation, under GATS, to permit Internet gam-
bling, though this obligation could be overruled by the need to
protect the public morals and/or to maintain public order.161
However, the Appellate Body concluded that, in light of the
Interstate Horseracing Act which permitted interstate off-track
betting on horse races, the measures applied by the United States
to protect public morals and to maintain order, namely the Wire
Act, the Travel Act and the Illegal Gambling Business Act, were
inconsistently applied and therefore did not meet the require-
ments of the public morals/public order exception.162 The
Appellate Body also concluded that, by allowing interstate off-
Since Internet gambling has
proven so profitable, there is
little incentive for foreign
countries to curb access by
U.S. citizens to online gam-
bling sites, which lawfully
generate revenue and jobs in
these countries.
track betting on horse racing, the United States was not applying
the prohibitions provided by the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the
Illegal Gambling Business Act against both foreign and domes-
tic providers of off-site gambling services relating to horse rac-
ing.163
In summary, the Appellate Body of the WTO has deter-
mined that the United States had not shown it was meeting its
GATS obligations regarding gambling and betting services per-
taining to off-track wagering on horse racing.  How the United
States will respond to this interpretation of GATS, as applied to
Internet wagering on horse races, remains to be seen. 
The Internet Gambling Prohibition and Enforcement Act
In November 2005, H.R. 4411, also known as the
“Internet Gambling Prohibition and Enforcement Act,” was
introduced in the House seeking to strengthen the prohibition
on Internet gambling.164 This measure seeks to strengthen the
Wire Act by prohibiting the use of credit cards and electronic
fund transfers for the payment of gambling debts.165 The Act
also creates regulations requiring financial institutions to block
credit card and electronic fund transfers to Internet gambling
businesses whether domestic or overseas.166 Worth noting is
the fact that the Act has no limiting effect on pari-mutuel wager-
ing, which includes off-track betting on horse races.167
Consequently, the Act maintains the present carve-out excep-
tion for interstate off-track gambling involving the Internet.
The Act makes no attempt to bring the United States into com-
pliance with the GATS obligations voiced by the WTO in
response to the Antiguan 2003 complaint.  
H.R. 4411 passed in the House on July 11, 2006 and is
now on the Senate Legislative Calendar.168 It remains to be
seen though whether the bill will be passed by the Senate; and
even if enacted into law, whether it will have any practical
effect on the Internet gambling industry.
The Internet gambling industry is rapidly growing, and
foreign online gambling sites are being created at an amazing
rate.  Yet Internet gambling has been embraced by only one
state, Nevada, and remains an activity otherwise prohibited by
many state and federal laws.  Despite a multitude of federal
laws, such as the Wire Act, the Travel Act, the Illegal Gambling
Business Act, and RICO statutes for combating Internet gam-
bling, Internet access to foreign-based gambling websites is
readily available to U.S. citizens, and it is rare for an operator
of one of these online sites to face federal criminal prosecution.
At the same time, the gambling landscape in the United States
is transforming so rapidly with the expansion of state-sponsored
gambling, the rise of Indian gaming, and the permissive posture
of the U.S. government towards interstate off-track betting on
horseracing that continued efforts to criminalize Internet gam-
bling appear both futile and irrational.  As the scope of land-
based gambling and off-site gambling continues to expand, it is
likely that the United States will have continued difficulties in
meeting its obligations under GATS if the United States contin-
ues its absolute ban on foreign Internet gambling services.     
Thus, as to whether the United States Federal
Government should continue its efforts to criminalize Internet
gambling, the economics of the gaming industry and the practi-
cal limitations regarding enforcement of present or future crim-
inal laws lends to one conclusion:  know when to fold.  The time
is ripe to switch from criminalization to regulation.
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